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Abstract—We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-
inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coor-
dinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource
(e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive
to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource
utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the
community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a
fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds
in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of
users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent
selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary,
interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each
user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support
of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to
secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth
is subject to the remaining “buying power” of each user and by
prevalent “market prices” – both of which are determined by
the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on
link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the
underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic
results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid
bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real
network traces, we present extensive experimental results that
demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to
be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient
implementation architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation: The ever increasing appetite for Peer-to-Peer
(P2P), media streaming, and Video on Demand (VoD) content
is forcing service providers to constantly upgrade their infras-
tructures to keep-up with customers bandwidth demands. This
state-of-affairs is significantly exacerbated by the prevalence
of flat-pricing schemes and hence the lack of an incentive
for users to moderate their hunger for network bandwidth,
especially around periods of peak network utilization, which
are the primary determinants of an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) costs (both in terms of infrastructure upgrade cycle and
† Supported in part by the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and
COLCIENCIAS–Instituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la
Tecnologı´a “Francisco Jose´ de Caldas”.
‡ Supported in part by NSF awards CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-
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inter-AS traffic volume costs due to the 95/5 rule). Attempts
by ISPs to deviate from flat pricing (including field-tested per-
byte pricing [1]) have been widely rejected by customers [2].
This is also reinforced by the prevalence of flat pricing in the
telephony market [3].
In addition to the significant capital investments that ISPs
must shoulder to ensure that their networks are well pro-
visioned during the few hours of peak demand, the new
(Internet) world order of seemingly unbounded hunger for
bandwidth further complicates fundamental issues that have
confounded the networking community for decades, including
the adoption of an acceptable notion of fairness as it relates
to congestion management. Congestion increases delay and
losses, reducing the perceived Quality of Service (QoS) of
interactive applications such as web browsing, VoIP, and
video streaming. Dealing with congestion requires that users
(flows) “pay” for their share of the congestion they cause [4],
resulting in a degradation in QoS (the congestion price). But,
when interactive applications are forced to compete with non-
interactive applications such as P2P filesharing, background
backup services, or VoD downloads, the degradation in QoS
becomes unacceptable.
Under flat pricing, during periods of peak demand, current
congestion control practices could be seen as particularly “un-
fair” to users of low-volume, mostly-interactive applications
who would be effectively subsidizing “bandwidth hogs.” This
has prompted some ISPs to act as arbiters, proactively shaping
user traffic by setting quotas,1 or by preferentially treating
different traffic payloads (e.g., web browsing vs. bittorrent
downloads) during periods of peak demand.2 These efforts
have backfired, eliciting a public relations quagmire regarding
1 Incidentally, when demand is well below the provider’s nominal capacity,
supporting bandwidth hogs is basically free, bringing to question the use of
traffic volume “quotas” [5].
2 Along these lines, there is a growing body of academic [6], [7], [8], [9],
[10], [11] and industry [12], [13], [14], [15], [16] work on delineating interac-
tive from non-interactive traffic in order to police/balance consumption. Many
of these systems depend on Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) techniques, raising
concerns about consumer privacy. Moreover, the scalability and resilience of
these techniques is also questionable as applications adapt quickly to avoid
detection, e.g. by using encryption and randomization of port numbers.
2violation of “Net Neutrality,” [17], [18] which is perceived as
the prime reason for the Internet being the cradle of innovation
it is [19]. Proactive ISP intervention based on traffic payload
also raises concerns regarding monopolistic practices, e.g.,
blocking or taxing Video/VoIP services not provided by the
same ISP [19].
Scope and Contributions: Rather than having ISPs act as
arbiters who set the rules regarding what constitutes fair usage
of a shared resource, in this paper, we propose a voluntary,
market-based Trade & Cap (T&C) system in which user
software agents converge on what they perceive as an equitable
allocation of resources, irrespective of what these resources are
used to support (HTTP vs P2P traffic) and irrespective of the
absolute resource allocation (traffic volume) per user.3 . In our
setting, the role of the ISP is that of providing a mechanism
that supports any privately-defined user policy [21].
Effectively, our proposed T&C mechanism sets up a mar-
ketplace. Given the fixed (flat-rate) payment to the provider,
customers enter this marketplace with equal buying power, but
their use of this fairly-allocated buying power depends on their
flexibility. This allows customers to trade “volume” during
low-utilization periods for “quality” during peak-utilization
periods (or vice versa). The direction of the trade (not to men-
tion the user’s willingness to even engage in trading) depends
entirely on user preferences and flexibility (e.g., tolerance for
delaying a scheduled network backup job).4 In addition to
empowering customers to trade bandwidth allocations, T&C
has the desirable side effect of smoothing traffic utilization
over time, thus reducing the ISP’s cost which is determined
primarily by the peak rate.
Outline and Summary of Results: We start this paper in
Section II by overviewing the T&C mechanism as it applies
to a Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (DSLAM)
setting, and in Sections III and IV by presenting analytical
results pertaining to convergence and efficiency of the market-
place underlying T&C. Formulating the problem as a game is
not only useful for purposes of modeling and understanding
the marketplace dynamics, but also it serves as the basis of
a real mechanism that can be implemented and applied in
practice. Thus, in Section VI we discuss the salient features of
an implementation architecture for T&C in a DSLAM setting.
Our implementation allows the marketplace interactions to
be carried out by software agents that run on behalf of the
users and the ISP, and thus (with the exception of minimal
configuration and parametrization) is quite transparent to the
end user. Next, in Section VII, we demonstrate the significant
advantages of T&C by presenting results from extensive trace-
driven simulations. For instance, we show that introducing a
relatively small level of flexibility in the scheduling of user
activities results in significant gains for both the users and the
3 We note that recent polls [20] indicate that consumers would accept traffic
allocation mechanisms that ensure fairness as long as these mechanisms do
not trample on net neutrality, privacy, etc.
4 We use the term “user” liberally since in practice, customer-side software
agents would make most decisions on behalf of the user.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the DSL “last-mile” architecture.
ISP. For example, allowing user agents to reposition bandwidth
allocations within relatively small windows of time enables
them to increase their share of fluid bandwidth (supporting
non-interactive applications) by 20% to 40% depending on
their flexibility. This benefits the ISP as well, resulting in as
much as 16% to 31% reduction in the 95th percentile of the
ISP’s 5-minute traffic volume, and (even more impressively)
resulting in smoothing traffic volume, reducing the 95th-
percentile/50th-percentile ratio from 1.58 to an almost perfect
ratio of 1.004. We conclude the paper in Section VIII with a
review of the related literature.
II. T&C IN A DSLAM SETTING
While our T&C mechanism is applicable to any setting in
which it is desirable to coordinate the fractional acquisition
by a set of rational parties of the shared capacity of a single
resource, in this paper, and without loss of generality, we
restrict ourselves to a specific setting – that of coordinating
the utilization of a shared DSLAM link.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic architecture of Digital Sub-
scriber Line (DSL) access technology. In this setting, DSL
modems on the customer side connect hundreds to thousands
of users to a single DSLAM server on the provider network.
DSLAMs connect to a Broadband Remote Access Server
(BRAS) which relays traffic to/from the Internet. In this
setting, the DSLAM-BRAS link poses the most significant
traffic management problems for ISPs and is thus the shared
resource managed using our T&C mechanism.5
As we alluded before, we envision a marketplace where
DSL customers are empowered to trade capacity over time,
so as to facilitate the exchange of traffic volume for QoS.
This exchange is desirable given the different utility that
various applications attribute to traffic volume vs. QoS (e.g.,
Fluid-Traffic (FT) applications value traffic volume whereas
Reserved Traffic (RT) applications value QoS).6 In the envi-
sioned marketplace, the DSLAM server’s role is to enforce the
capacity allocations agreed upon by the DSL customers. By
doing so the ISP will benefit as well, as the T&C marketplace
dynamics result in a more balanced load over time, improving
user satisfaction and alleviating the need for infrastructure
upgrades to accommodate peak demand.
5 T&C is equally valuable and practical if the resource to be managed is not
“physical” but rather “virtual” – e.g., the aggregate inter-ISP (transit) traffic
of a subnetwork. Our distributed implementation architecture discussed in
Section VI is particularly suited for managing such resources.
6 Our T&C mechanism ensures that resource allocations are based on true
valuations by the users themselves (rather than assumed by the ISP).
3For our purposes, we assume that the marketplace will
operate over fixed, non-overlapping periods of time, which we
call epochs (e.g., days), and that the trading and allocation of
capacity will occur within T subdivisions of an epoch, which
we call time-slots, e.g., 288 5-minute slots per day to match a
de facto industry standard of 5 minutes for traffic accounting
and pricing.
At the beginning of each epoch, the operator assigns each
agent i = 1, 2, . . . n an allowance or budget Bi in accordance
with the user’s Service Level Agreement (SLA) (e.g., “Busi-
ness” versus “Residential” plans). Under flat pricing, which we
assume in this paper, all customers receive an equal budget.
Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases:
(1) The Bandwidth Trading Phase: This phase proceeds as a
pure-strategies, non-cooperative game among agents, who are
allowed to rationally and selfishly decide when to schedule
bandwidth allocations in support of their RT sessions. An RT
session is a consecutive set of time-slots during which a par-
ticular RT application – one with fixed demands per time-slot
– is active. For example, a user may have a browsing and an e-
mail RT session from 7-8pm and another video-streaming RT
session from 10-11pm. Although not necessary for analytical
purposes, in our experiments as well as in our implementation
architecture, we enforce the practical requirement that sessions
be atomic – i.e., a video-streaming session cannot be broken
up or interrupted. The scheduling of RT sessions is subject to
preset user preferences and constraints. The outcome of this
game is a Nash-Equilibrium (NE) of RT bandwidth allocations
to all participating agents, along with the corresponding cost
incurred by each agent.
(2) The Bandwidth Capping Phase: This phase proceeds as
a market-clearing phase, in which the operator distributes any
remaining capacity among agents. The amount of “remaining”
capacity distributed in this phase is set based on a desirable
nominal utilization of the link (e.g., determined by the 95/5
rule threshold). The allocation of bandwidth in the capping
phase rewards agents who were able to preserve more of their
budgets in the trading phase (due to a low RT volume or
due to flexibility in scheduling such traffic), ensuring a market
equilibrium of the resulting allocations.
III. THE BANDWIDTH TRADING PHASE
Each agent i represents its RT demand as a vector of requested
bandwidth allocations: Ti = (ti1, . . . , tili). An assignment
of an agent’s demand is a mapping that pins each one of
the components of the vector to a different time slot. A set
of such assignments (one per agent) comprises a potential
configuration, or schedule of RT utilization at the DSLAM.
Let k = mi(j) be the time slot assigned to the jth compo-
nent of agent i’s request vector. We denote by xik the actual
allocation for agent i in time-slot k, where xik = ti,mi(j). The
xik notation implicitly represents the mapping mi(), noting
that for time-slots that are not used in the mapping, we assume
that xik = 0. Thus, xik is defined for all time-slots.
Definition 1. (Cost Function) The cost of the RT vector Ti is
ci =
1
C
T∑
p=1
xipUp (1)
where Up =
∑n
i=1 xip is the aggregate reservation on slot p,
and C is a constant.
The above cost function (which is proportional to the
product of the current utilization and the demand of the agent
over all time slots) can be interpreted as a cost-sharing scheme
where each agent pays its fair share of the price of each time
slot, which depends on the square of the time-slot’s utilization
ci =
1
C
T∑
p=1
U2p
(
xip
Up
)
The motivation for the cost function in Equation 1 is two-
fold. First, in schemes where cost is constant or proportional to
the user’s demand, there is no incentive for an agent to avoid
congested time-slots – a given level of resource (bandwidth)
usage costs the same in either case. Our cost function creates
the desired incentive of steering agents away from congested
time slots (if they possess the flexibility to do so). Second, our
cost function is fair in the sense that users sharing the same
time slot pay the same unit-price. Non-linear cost functions
(of which ours is an instance) have been used before [22] to
control congestion and achieve “proportional fairness.”
The strategy space S∗i for agent i is the set of permutations
of its request vector. As such, the strategy space is finite
with cardinality |S∗i | = PTli . The game’s strategy space isthe Cartesian product of the strategy spaces of all agents:
S = ×Si. Initially, we will assume that all the points in the
strategy space are feasible, and later we will incorporate RT
sessions and capacity/budget constraints.
Theorem 1. The pure strategies game in which agents adopt
better/best responses to allocate atomic units of traffic in per-
user, mutually-exclusive time-slots converges to a NE.
Proof: We define the following potential function:
Φ =
n∑
i=1
ci =
1
C
T∑
p=1
U2p
When an agent makes a cost-reducing move, ∆ci < 0,
1
C
∑
p
(
x′ipU
′
p − xipUp
)
< 0 (2)
Notice that for any other agent k #= i, its utilization of interval
p does not change, but the change in the total utilization affects
its cost as follows
∆ck =
1
C
∑
p
xkp(U
′
p − Up)
4Adding the changes of the agents other than i we get
∑
k #=i
∆ck =
∑
k #=i
(
1
C
∑
p
xkp(U
′
p − Up)
)
=
1
C
∑
p

(U ′p − Up)∑
k #=i
xkp


=
1
C
∑
p

(x′ip − xip)∑
k #=i
xkp

 (3)
where in the last step we used the fact that U ′p−Up = x′ip−xip
because agents other than p did not change their allocations.
Since the components of x′ip are the same as those of xip (but
in different positions), we observe that ∑p x′2ip = ∑p x2ip.
With this, we can reorganize expression (2) as follows
1
C
∑
p
(
x′ipU
′
p − xipUp
)
=
1
C
∑
p

(x′ip − xip)∑
k #=i
xkp

 < 0
which is exactly the same as (3), i.e. ∑k #=i∆ck = ∆ci < 0.
As the sum of negative quantities is negative, we get∑
i
∆ci = ∆Φ < 0
i.e. the potential is monotonically decreasing and is lower-
bounded by some constant greater than zero. This lets us
conclude that the game converges to a Nash Equilibrium.
As we alluded before, it may be the case that an agent may
have additional constraints that limit its strategy space – e.g., a
2-hour-long RT fixed bandwidth allocation must be assigned in
consecutive time-slots, and be scheduled to start between 6pm
and 8pm. Such constraints are easily captured by defining the
agent’s strategy space as a subset of Si ⊆ S∗i . Three practical
examples of such constraints are: (1) RT sessions to enforce
the atomicity of reservations for application sessions that
span several consecutive time-slots, (2) Capacity constraints
to ensure that the shared link capacity is never exceeded
by the aggregate allocation – ∀p : ∑ni=1 xip ≤ C, and (3)
Budget constraints to ensure that no agent is able to reserve
resources beyond his “fair” share, which is upper-bounded by
the agent’s allowance – ∀i : 1
C
∑T
p=1 xipUp ≤ Bi. Notice
that these sets of constraints correspond to the elimination of
infeasible points in the strategy space S. This removal can be
easily accomplished by setting to ∞ the cost for the agent at
unfeasible points.
Theorem 2. (Convergence to NE under constraints) Given a
pure strategies game, such that each agent’s action space is
finite, and that converges under better/best response dynamics
to a NE, then after adding constraints to the action space
of one or more agents, the game still converges, given that
there exists feasible configurations after the addition of the
constraints.
Proof: Consider the following directed graph G =<
V,E >: There is a vertex vj ∈ V for every possible point in
the strategy space vj = (a1j1 , . . . , anjn), where aij denotes
the jth action of agent i. There is and edge epq ∈ E for any
valid transition7 on the strategy space, i.e. the cost associated
with agent i at vertex p is larger than the cost at vertex q:
cp(i) > cq(i) and a−i,p = a−i,q , meaning that the actions of
all agents other than i are the same in p and q. Let us call
G the transition graph of the game. Then, if the game always
converges to a NE in the unconstrained case, G is a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG). Any path (sequence of actions) the
agents traverse when following their rational-selfish goal will
always reach a vertex with no outgoing edges corresponding
to a NE (of possibly many) of the game. The addition of
constraints to the agents actions, corresponds to removing
unfeasible vertices from V as well as the edges coming into
or out of these vertices. Let G′ be the residual transition graph
after removing unfeasible vertices and edges. Suppose the new
game with constraints does not always converge to a NE. Then,
there exists at least one cycle in the residual transition graph
G′. Being G′ a subgraph of G this implies the same cycle
must exist in the original graph G, contradicting the fact that
G is a DAG.
Figure 2 illustrates the construction used in the proof. In
(a) it shows the DAG corresponding to the transitions of some
hypothetical game, where states v6 and v8 are the NE. In
(b) v4 and v6 have been removed with their respective edges
because they are unfeasible. The NE in the residual graph
are v3 and v8. Notice that the set of NE vertices after the
addition of constraints need not to be the same as those of the
unconstrained game. In particular, feasible vertices that were
not a NE will become a NE if all their outgoing edges are
removed.
An important consideration when considering equilibria of
non-cooperative games is the Price of Anarchy (PoA) – the
ratio of the social cost at the worst-case equilibrium compared
to the best possible. In the case of the Bandwidth Trading
game, the social cost (understood in our case of study as
the system metric we want to optimize) is the maximum slot
utilization.
Theorem 3. (Price of Anarchy for Bandwidth Trading) When
user sessions are described as finite sequences of fixed size
allocations, the PoA on the per-slot load is n.
Proof: A loose bound on the PoA for the trading game
is trivial: Given a maximum allocation per agent, Xmax, it
may be the case that all the n agents have an equally-large
demand, and there exists a NE where these demands coincide
in the same time slot. On the other hand, there is always going
to be a slot with utilization of at least Xmax, therefore this is
a lower-bound on the slot utilization. Therefore we have the
bounds
Xmax ≤ max{Up} ≤ nXmax
7 Observe that the set of edges in not limited to best-responses, but includes
any feasible move
5(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Transition graphs for a pure strategies game. a) Without constraints, b) With constraints
These loose bounds immediately imply that
PoA ≤
worst− case max{Up}
optimal max{Up}
= n
To show that this bound is tight, we present in Fig. 3 an in-
stance that realizes it. In this example there are n agents, each
one having a session of length n+kn, and the total number of
time-slots is n+kn+n−1 = n(k+2)−1. Fig. 3a shows the
optimal allocation which yields an max{Up} = Xmax, and
part (b) shows a NE whose max{Up} = nXmax. Part (b) is
a NE because any unilateral deviation by any agent, gives an
higher cost. In fact the agent cost at NE is
ci =
1
C
∑
p
xipUp =
nX2max + k
C
And the cost for a agent if he moves any integral number of
positions (within the allowed time-slots) is
c′i =
1
C
∑
p
xipUp =
X2max + 2k
C
and c′i > ci whenever k ≥ (n− 1)X2max.
It is important to notice that realizing the above PoA bound
requires a carefully crafted problem instance. In practice it
is very unlikely to find instances with these characteristics.
In fact, to evaluate the practical behavior of the PoA we
conducted a series of simulations following this procedure:
1) Create a problem instance whose optimal allocation
is known. The load-balancing problem itself is NP-
Complete 8 . On the other hand, constructing an instance
with a known optimal solution is simple: Take the slots,
assume they are all equally filled say with 1 unit. Split
the content of each slot in several fractions and then
take sequences of elements from different slots to be
8 It is easy to see this by reduction to the 2-PARTITION[23] problem. If
we had a polynomial algorithm that solves the load-balancing problem, we
could run this algorithm on an instance of the partition problem with two
slots. If the sum of the elements in the two slots is equal, the answer to the
PARTITION problem is “yes”, otherwise is “no”
the tasks of the agents. Finally, shuffle around the tasks
of the agents to get a problem instance.
2) For different number of agents (this defines the game
size) and of time-slots we create multiple problem
instances. In our case we created 100 instances for each
game size.
3) Run the game by letting the agents take turns and play
their best response until the game reaches a NE. Take
the maximum among all the instances of the same size,
and then compute the ratio with respect to the known
optimum. This gives the empirical ratio of the worst-case
to the optimal.
The results of these simulations are illustrated in Figure 4,
with 5 slots (a) and 10 slots (b). In practice, the PoA for the
trading phase (game) is almost always below 2, and tends to
be insignificant as the number of agents (size of the game)
increases, which bodes well for our setting.
IV. THE BANDWIDTH CAPPING PHASE
The Capping Phase computes a market-clearing solution that
allocates the left-over budget of the agents in such a way that
maximizes the aggregate FT allocation for each user. LetWi =
(wi1, . . . , wiT ) be the vector of FT allocations, where wip ∈
R+ is the allocation of FT for agent i in time-slot p. We
adjust the definition of the cost function to take into account
the allocation of FT as follows:
Definition 2. The cost to agent i for the combined allocation
of RT (xip) and FT (wip) is
ci(Wi) =
1
C
T∑
p=1
(xip + wip)Up (4)
where Up =
∑n
i=1(xip+wip) is the aggregate reservation on
slot p, and C is a constant.9
The implicit assumption of the Capping Phase is that RT
allocations have priority, and are fixed once determined by the
9 The results in this section can be generalized for cost functions of the
form ci(Wi) = 1C
PT
p=1(xip+wip)f(Up), where f() is a continuous andtwice differentiable convex function. See [24].
6(a) Optimal placement with max{Up} = Xmax
(b) NE with max{Up} = nXmax
Fig. 3. Tight example for the PoA of the Bandwidth Trading Game
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Fig. 4. Empirical Price-of-Anarchy based on synthetic worksets
Trading Phase. FT allocations have no scheduling constraints:
the value accrued by FT applications is strictly increasing with
the aggregate allocation of FT bandwidth. Thus, self-interested
agents select allocations so as to:
Maximize
bi(Wi) =
T∑
p=1
wip (5)
subject to
ci(Wi) ≤ Bi (6)
wip ≥ 0 for p = 1, . . . , T (7)
A fundamental question that arises is the existence of an
equilibrium solution for the FT marketplace. The following
theorem shows that an equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 4. (Existence of Nash-Equilibrium for FT Band-
width Allocation) There exists a set of per-user allocation
vectors that, when feasible for each user, maximizes the total
per-user allocation and is a NE.
In order to prove this theorem, we need first the following
lemmas:
Lemma 1. (Existence of the per-user solution) When the per-
user FT maximization problem is feasible, there is a globally
optimal solution (for a given set of allocations by the other
agents).
Proof: (Sketch) If the cost ci(Wi) < Bi when wij = 0,
then there are feasible allocations of the fluid components wij .
Notice also, that the feasible space defined as
D = {Wi ∈ R
T |wij ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , T and ci(Wi) ≤ Bi}
7is convex. This follows from the fact that the constraints of
equations 7 and 6 are concave functions. Then, by the Khun
and Tucker (KT) theorem under convexity10 there is vector
W ∗i that maximizes the objective function bi() with associated
Lagrange multipliers λ∗iq, γ∗i , such that the Kuhn-Tucker first
order conditions
Dbi(Wi) +
T∑
q=1
λ∗iqDWi + γ
∗
iDci(Wi) = 0 (8)
λ∗iq ≥ 0, γ
∗
i ≥ 0,
T∑
q=1
λ∗iqwiq + γ
∗
i ci(Wi) = 0 (9)
are satisfied at Wi = W ∗i
The Lagrangean of the per-agent optimization problem is
L(Wi,λi, γi) = bi(Wi) +
T∑
q=1
λiqwiq + γici(Wi)
and eq. 8 can be succinctly written as
DL(Wi,λi, γi) = 0
Lemma 2. (Uniqueness of the per-user solution) The user’s
optimal solution is unique
Proof: Suppose it is not. Let X and Y be two distinct
global maximizers of bi(). Let Z = αX + (1− α)Y for α ∈
(0, 1). By the convexity of D, it is always the case that Z ∈ D.
By the linearity of bi()
bi(Z) = αbi(X) + (1− α)bi(Y )
= bi(X)
the second step because being X,Y global maximizers, it is
the case that bi(X) = bi(Y ). This means that all the points
Z in the hyperline segment defined by X,Y are also global
maximizers.
Define the left-over budget at point Z as
$(Z) = Bi −
∑
p
(xip + zip)Up
Then, $(X) = $(Y ) = 0, otherwise if there is a positive left-
over budget and the agent could increase its benefit and X,Y
would not be maximizers. It is also the case that $(Z) is strictly
concave (this follows from D2$(Z) being a negative definite
matrix), therefore
$(Z) > α$(X) + (1− α)$(Y )
This contradicts the previous observation that Z is a global
maximizer, because whenever there is a positive left-over
budget, the agent can increase the allocation in at least some
time-slot thus increasing its total benefit.
Proof: of Theorem 4 Define the following global fluid
maximization problem:
Maximize
n∑
i=1
T∑
p=1
wip (10)
10 See theorem 7.16 [25]
subject to
ci(Wi) ≤ Bi for i = 1, . . . , n (11)
wip ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n and p = 1, . . . , T(12)
The Lagrangean of this problem is
L(W,λ, γ) =
n∑
i=1
(
T∑
p=1
wip +
T∑
p=1
λipwip + γici(Wi)
)
,
(13)
where W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) is the concatenation of the per-
user allocation vectors, and λ, γ are the concatenations of
the per-user Lagrange multipliers. Observe that eq. 13 is the
sum of the corresponding Lagrangeans for the user prob-
lems, therefore a feasible W ∗ that maximizes 10, is also a
global maximum for the per-user problems (all the terms in
DL(W,λ, γ) =
∑n
i=1DL(Wi,λi, γi) = 0 have to be zero, as
none can be negative). Being the per-user allocations a global
maximum, no agent can improve by unilaterally deviating from
this allocation vector, hence W ∗ is a NE.
V. OTHER APPLICATION SCENARIOS
Load balancing problems arise in multitude of situations of
which the DSLAM scenario we have considered so far is just
one example. The model we have presented is general and can
be applied in other scenarios where the customer tasks can be
modeled as a combination of atomic and fluid processes and
all the customers compete to complete their tasks with the
lowest cost.
One example of this necessity is given by Greenberg et al
[26] in provisioning datacenter resources, more specifically
energy and network capacity. Both resources are typically
charged based on the 95/5 rule, and for the case of the
datacenter this is a direct cost, making the incentive for the
reduction of peak utilization more direct, but without changing
the fundamental characteristics of the resource marketplace
we have presented.11 In particular, energy requirements of
different tasks can be describe as vectors of power consump-
tion per time-slot, Ti = (ti1, . . . , tili). Tasks may also be
constrained to be executed within some time-interval and the
charge associated with the execution of the tasks is determined
by the total energy consumption according to eq. (4). Then,
the customers can schedule the execution of their tasks by
using the trading mechanism as already described in §III.
Similarly, there are fluid tasks, that may use all the capacity
available to them, and that run forever. Examples of such tasks
are the crawling, indexing and ranking processes on a web
search engine. We can think of these tasks as fluid-tasks and
assign them a variable amount of resources per time-slot as to
maximize the total amount of work they can perform at the
lowest cost. In addition, the possibility of assigning budgets to
different tasks permits adjusting the fraction of the resources
they get. In fact Greenberg et al suggest using pricing and
11 In the DSLAM case with flat-rate payments, the incentive comes from
exchanging flexibility on interactive applications with volume for fluid appli-
cations.
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“urgency of execution” as parameters to reduce the peak-to-
valley ratio on the utilization of these resources, precisely the
notions captured by our mechanism.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF A T&C DSLAM MARKETPLACE
Architecture:We describe a distributed implementation of the
T&C marketplace, where there is one provider agent (running
at the DSLAM for example), and a client-side agent running
on the customer’s local router. The general architecture of
the system is illustrated in Figure 5. In this architecture, the
client-side agent is responsible for: (1) profiling the customer’s
RT demand, (2) bidding for allocations during the bandwidth
trading phase, and (3) shaping applications’ traffic according
to the reserved allocations. The provider-side agent provides
two functionalities: (1) it runs the marketplace phases –
bandwidth trading and bandwidth capping – just before the
start of each epoch; and (2) once the epoch starts, enforces
the allocations settled by the marketplace agents by using a
traffic shaper for each customer line. The traffic shaper on the
provider side enforces the total allocation determined by the
T&C marketplace, but does not need to classify traffic, thus
overhead is minimal.
The traffic shapers – both on the client-side and the
provider-side – need not to be strict reservation based. The
drawback of a strict reservation system is that it does not
take advantage of the statistical multiplexation between the
flows sharing the link. To avoid this limitation, we use a work-
conserving scheduler, namely a derivative of the hierarchical
link-sharing scheduler [27] – the Hierarchical Token Bucket
(HTB) – which is currently available in the Linux kernel
[28]. When using a work conserving scheduler, if some
of the sources are idle, the unused capacity is distributed
between the other sources. As a consequence, the reservations
established in the T&C marketplace are minimum guarantees,
but the aggregate utilization can always reach the total reserved
capacity.
Handling traffic on the customer side requires the imple-
mentation of a two-level priority queuing system, with the high
priority assigned to RT demand and the low priority assigned
to FT demand. This way, packets belonging to RT applications
preempt any pending packets in the FT queue. The root traffic
Fig. 6. Implementation using priority queues
shaper ensures that the customer does not exceed its total
allocated bandwidth.12 The routing of packets to each one
of these queues could be implemented in a number of ways,
including using manual configuration on a per application
basis, using an automatic traffic classifier ([6], [7], [9], [11]),
or using special APIs that allow applications to bind to specific
virtual interfaces.
The entire system operates on the local domain defined by
the DSLAM and the finite (customer) population attached to it.
For accounting and policing purposes, the system would need
to uniquely identify each customer. Authentication – in many
cases already in place at the physical or link layers, depending
on the underlying technology (e.g., xDSL) – is needed to
protect against “identity theft” whereby a customer would
spoof the MAC address of another in the same DSLAM to
avoid having its traffic counted against its own budget. Notice
that to account for traffic during each epoch, the provider agent
only needs the total allocation per customer. This information
is enough to ensure that the customer is adhering to the
outcomes of the T&C mechanism for each time slot. From
the providers perspective it is irrelevant if the customer is
using a bandwidth allotment for RT or FT bandwidth. In fact,
this assures that the provider’s policing mechanism is indeed
neutral with regard to the customer’s traffic.
Priority/weighted queueing systems have long been used in
the QoS literature. An implicit assumption in that literature
is that priorities/weights are assigned consistently by the end
systems. However, when self-interested agents compete for the
same resource, their choice would be to assign themselves
the highest priority, unless there is a cost associated with this
choice. Our T&C mechanism incorporates such a cost, thus
providing the needed incentive for agents to act truthfully.
Algorithmic Complexity and Efficient Distributed Imple-
mentation: A scheme like ours would not be practical if
associated processes are not efficient to compute.
To compute the best-response in the trading phase, we
developed a dynamic programming solution which is pseudo-
polynomial (complexity depends on the product of the number
of sessions per user and the number of time slots) and which
runs in a few seconds on current hardware for instances of
practical sizes of hundreds of users and hundreds of time slots
(108 and 288, respectively in our simulations). The dynamic
12 A future extension would allow for a distributed implementation of the
hierarchical scheduler, such that the capacity of the shared resource can be
statistically multiplexed among the customers sharing the link. This way, the
system would not have a per-customer cap due to the hard reservations.
9programming solution, when finding the best response for user
i proceeds as follows:
1) Let k be number of sessions of agent i, and T the
number of time-slots
2) Initialize the matrix A of dimension k×T . Each element
ajp of A will represent the cumulative cost of sessions
1 . . . j ≤ k, when the jth session is allocated in slot p.
All the matrix elements are initialized to infinity.
3) The first row is computed by assuming session 1 is
placed in slot p and computing the resulting cost.
4) Subsequent rows (j = 2 . . . k) are computed according
to eqn. (14). Here, c(j, p) represents the cost of session
j at slot p (from eq. 1). Observe also that ajp is the
minimum cost at which all the sessions up to j can
be allocated in the time-slots up to p. Therefore, the
minimum of the last row min{ak,1...T } will give the
optimal cost for the entire set of sessions of the user.
The feasibility condition in eqn. (14) refers to the constraints
of the problem. Basically, different sessions do not overlap,
all the components of the session fall within the allowed time-
slots (1 . . . T ), and the cumulative cost is less or equal to the
budget. In particular, in the case of the user going over the
budget, we adopted the policy of dropping arbitrary sessions
until the budget constraint is satisfied. In our experiments
we did not implement the capacity constraint, although it
could be easily incorporated into the procedure. In doing so,
we allow for the utilization to grow as much as demanded,
which gives even more conservative estimates of the worst-
case performance metrics.
As for the fluid allocation computation in the capping phase,
the solution using Lagrange multipliers presented in Section
IV constitutes a straightforward distributed implementation,
whereby at the Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) each
agent computes its best response iteratively until it gets close
enough to the global optimum.
Running both the trading and capping processes at the
CPE is consistent with a network-neutral implementation. The
only support needed from the DSLAM would be to offer
a blackboard service where all the participants are able to
register their (RT and FT) allocations and query the totals
(Up) per time-slot. Once the market reaches an equilibrium,
the posted schedule is committed for the next epoch.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we use trace-driven simulations to (1) highlight
the benefits that a user in our system begets by exhibiting
some flexibility in scheduling its RT sessions under T&C, (2)
demonstrate the gains that an ISP stands to realize as a result
of the overall smoother traffic profile of T&C, and (3) illustrate
how various parameters affect the performance of T&C.
Traces and Trace Pre-Processing: As an alternative to direct
DSLAM traces (which unfortunately are not available), we
used publicly available WAN traces [29] to extract a slice
of traffic associated with a customer access network. Table I
Period 2009-03-31 00:00 – 2009-03-31 23:59
Total packets 1,551,089,845
TCP packets 1,194,409,653
UDP packets 4,321,852
Total TCP bytes (payload) 924,540,189,060
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WAN TRACE USED IN OUR EVALUATION.
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Fig. 7. Downstream trace for a subnet of broadband users
shows the main characteristics of these WAN traces. Capturing
a slice (portion) of the customer network’s traffic results in less
pronounced diurnal peak-to-valley ratios, which limits the per-
formance gains realized by T&C. Thus, the performance gains
reported in this section should be viewed as “conservative”.
Figure 7 shows the traffic aggregated over 5min time-slots for
the subnetwork we selected for our evaluation.
To extract traffic associated with a customer access net-
work, we applied the following pre-processing steps. First,
we identified subnets most likely associated with broadband
users, based on the upstream/downstream ratios, the activity
per port number, and diurnal activity patterns. Next, assuming
that each IP address is a single user/household, we classified
the traffic per user as either RT or FT. This was done
based on association of traffic activity with privileged port
numbers. Finally, we identified the various RT sessions per
user, with their corresponding demands per time-slot. Session
identification was done by setting a threshold on the length of
periods of high activity. We call this threshold Smax and it is
given as a number of time-slots. For most of our experiments
we considered the values Smax = 6 and Smax = 12
corresponding to half an hour and one hour respectively. If
any sequence of time-slots has length greater than Smax,
then we subtracted the minimum from this interval under the
assumption that it was due FT. By repeating this process on
any subinterval of length greater than Smax we obtained a set
of disjoint RT sessions for the user.
T&C operates by letting user agents express their flexibility
or willingness to move IT components (forward or backward
in time) some number of time slots. We define a session’s
slack to be the number of time slots that an agent is willing
to shift its session (back or forth in time). A slack of 0
implies no flexibility. A slack of 1 implies a willingness to
shift sessions by 5 minutes (our time slot) back or forth, if
such a shift is advantageous. Notice that moving a session
means a shift of the traffic attributed to that session for all time
10
ht
ajp =
{
∞ if session j is unfeasible at slot p
min{aj−1,1...p−1}+ c(j, p) otherwise (14)
slots spanned by that session (i.e., traffic in all time slots of a
single session is shifted equally to preserve session atomicity).
In our simulation we also enforced the condition that no
shifting sessions could overlap. This is consistent with users
not doing more activities on the same time-slot. Similarly, we
also enforced the condition of preserving the session ordering.
Although not required by our model, it implies less effort on
the part of the agent, and any results thus obtained are even
more conservative.
How Does T&C Impact the ISP’s Bottom Line? Our
first experiment aims to evaluate how the 95th percentile of
the ISP’s 5-minute traffic volume (the 95% traffic envelop)
changes as a result of letting users schedule their RT sessions
according to the trading phase of T&C. For brevity, we assume
that all agents adopt the same slack value for all their sessions.
Figure 8 shows two examples of the outcome after the market
reaches an equilibrium. On the left is the traffic per time-slot,
and on the right is the CDF of traffic per time-slot. Top row is
for session length threshold of Smax = 6, and the bottom row
is for Smax = 12 time-slots. Clearly, the session thresholding
process has little effect on the trace, being the most noticeable
effect the larger peak (from 130MB to 150MB). Table II shows
the values of the 95% traffic envelop. These results underscore
that selfishly scheduling RT sessions yields an equilibrium
with significant reduction in the 95% traffic envelop – up to
31% reduction when slack is 1 hours. Even for a small slack
of 15 minutes, the savings amount to 16%.
We emphasize that the benefit from bandwidth trading quan-
tified in the results in Table II (and elsewhere in this paper) is
rather conservative given the nature of the WAN traces used in
our evaluation, in which the peak-to-valley ratio is much lower
than those observed in most characterization studies, e.g., [30].
With workloads exhibiting typical variability, the benefits are
likely to be even more significant.
Smax = 6 Smax = 12
Slack 95%(MB) Savings% 95%(MB) Savings%
0 36.3 0.0 47.7 0.0
3 30.6 15.6 42.1 11.7
6 27.4 24.4 33.6 29.6
12 24.9 31.4 30.9 35.2
TABLE II
95% UTILIZATION RESULTING FROM BANDWIDTH TRADING.
We now consider experiments in which both phases of T&C
are carried out. In particular, after completing the trading
phase – thus scheduling all RT sessions in the trace – agents
allocate as much fluid traffic as possible in accordance with
their remaining budgets. Thus, an important consideration in
setting-up these experiments is the budget assignment. In
particular, we used the following policy: Let V denote the
nominal traffic per time-slot that results in a total volume
equal to the total traffic originally in the trace. We introduce a
control parameter R (for resistance) which allows the provider
to adjust the resulting traffic on the shared link. By setting
C = V/R (this is the C of the cost function in equation 4),
and the budget per customer to Bi = CT/n, the expected
utilization (without RT) is precisely C. In our traces (as
observed generally on the Internet) the FT component is much
larger than the RT component, therefore the RT stage is rarely
affected by the budget constraint.13
Figure 9 shows the outcome of the two phases of T&C
for a value of R = 1.0 and various slack values. The y-axis
is normalized with respect to V (the nominal volume under
perfectly balanced conditions, with no RT components). Due
to the presence of RT components, this quantity is always
(slightly) larger than 1.0. The session identification process
also capture a much larger peak in the case of Smax = 12.
Table III shows the 95% and 50% (median) of the time-
slot utilizations, as well as the ratio between them. These
results suggest that with T&C in place, the ratio is nearly 1.0,
resulting in a perfect flattening of traffic over time slots, thus
eliminating cost problems derived from spikes when using the
95/5 rule.
95% Median Ratio
Original 197.15 124.56 1.583
T&C Smax = 6 136.52 135.93 1.004
T&C Smax = 12 138.05 137.33 1.005
TABLE III
TRAFFIC VOLUME STATISTICS (IN MB) WITH AND WITHOUT T&C
How Does T&C Enable an ISP to Cap its Aggregate
Traffic Volume? The ISP is able to specify a target total
traffic volume on the managed link through its choice of the
resistance parameter R (which directly affects the constant
C and hence the budget Bi allocated to each agent). Figure
10a shows the total allocation per time-slot as a function of
R, when slack=0 (which is the worst-case in the sense that
under this scenario, the budgets are constrained the most). As
expected, R effectively controls the aggregate traffic volume
resulting from T&C. This volume is almost flat due to the
“fluid” nature of FT bandwidth allocation. The exception is
due to spikes underscoring the presence of large RT sessions
that could not be smoothed out under the chosen slack value.
Naturally, these spikes dissipate when larger slack values are
used (see Figure 9).
How Does ISP Resistance Impact the Allocation of FT
Traffic Relative to RT Traffic? Figure 10b compares the
per-user bandwidth allocations for different values of the
resistance, R. As before, the general trend is that the more RT
13 For large values of R, the budget constraint may impact RT allocations.
In the rare event when this happens, the policy we adopted was to randomly
drop user sessions in case the user runs out of budget in the trading phase.
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Fig. 8. Utilization over time for RT sessions with various slack values.
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Fig. 9. Total Traffic (RT+FT) for various slack values.
bandwidth requested by an agent during the trading phase, the
less FT allocation the agent is able to secure during the capping
phase. Increasing the values of R results in a corresponding
reduction in the aggregate allocation of FT bandwidth, with
large RT bandwidth consumers impacted the most.
How Does T&C Impact the User’s Bottom Line? To
evaluate T&C on a per-user basis, we compare how RT and
FT allocations vary across users. Figure 11 (left) shows a
clear negative corelation between the allotment of FT and RT
bandwidth. The relationship is not monotonic or deterministic
because it depends on the outcomes from the trading phase,
which affect the left-over budget for each agent. It is always
the case though that the larger the slack, the larger the FT
allocation for any given user (points along the same vertical
line in the plot). An agent with fixed RT demand increases its
allocation of FT bandwidth when it adds more flexibility to its
RT sessions. The results in Table IV expose this tradeoff for
selected levels of RT demand and resistances. For example,
when R = 4, an agent with a nominal 100MB of RT
bandwidth is able to capture 32% more FT traffic by accepting
a minimal slack of 3 for its RT sessions. A rather surprising
(and also desirable) finding – evident from Figure 11 and Table
IV – is that the user begets most of the benefit by introducing
a minimal amount of slack. Increasing the slack much beyond
that results in only marginal increases in FT allocation. In the
above example, by doubling its slack from 3 to 6, the user is
able to capture only 3% more FT traffic. The message is clear:
it “pays” to be flexible, even if minimally so.
Figure 11 (right) shows the same results on a semi-log scale
to expose the outcome for users with negligible demand for
RT bandwidth. In this case, the capping phase assigns to all
such users almost equal share of the capacity (as expected). It
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Fig. 10. Traffic allocations for variable R.
R=4.0 R=2.0 R=1.0
Slack 100MB 200MB 400MB
3 1.3190 1.2836 1.1931
6 1.3497 1.3338 1.2329
12 1.4079 1.3769 1.2520
TABLE IV
FT BANDWIDTH GAIN FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF R AND RT DEMAND.
is only the heavy RT bandwidth hogs who are unable to claim
much FT bandwidth, which is precisely the premise of T&C.
Convergence to Equilibrium and Scalability: Back in §VI
we discussed the algorithmic complexity of computing best-
responses during the trading phase, and gave a pseudo-
polynomial algorithm for its solution. It was also shown
that the computation of market bids for the capping phase
is polynomial. To evaluate the convergence speed, and how
well the marketplace scaled for large numbers of participating
agents, we conducted a series of simulations where we vary
the number of agents and register the number of trials until the
market reaches equilibrium. A trial is a single agent iteration
and includes both, computing and submitting the bid to the
marketplace. Taking a given number of agents n, we conducted
100 different experiments and counted the aggregated number
of trials of all the agents. The worst-case among those 100
experiments is registered in the Figure 12. The experiments
show that the total number of trials until convergence follows
a linear trend, and timing measurements show that the market-
clearing allocations can be computed in less than few seconds
(less than 10 sec in a 2.4Ghz P4 system).
VIII. RELATED WORK
While the application of game-theoretic and micro-economic
approaches to networking problems is not novel [31], [22], [4],
[32], [33], our approach of strategically trading-off allocation
slots based on desirable properties for different traffic classes
is new and quite promising.
Laoutaris and Rodriguez [5] recognized that the problems
associated with rampant FT traffic are due to the lack of
incentives for end-users to properly schedule their FT traffic
and the lack of network mechanisms to identify and handle
such traffic. As a solution to the first problem, they suggest
giving users “higher-than-purchased” access rate during off-
peak hours as a reward for time-shifting their FT traffic. As a
solution to the second problem, they propose the introduction
of a store-and-forward service to handle the network transfer
of bulk FT data during off-peak hours.
Fairness is a very controversial issue with no universally-
accepted definition. The most commonly used definition is that
of max-min fairness, whereby no user can increase its rate at
the expense of other users with lower rates. Max-min fairness
deals with instantaneous rates, and thus is useless over long
time scales under time-varying demands. In many contexts,
fairness is a property established across flows (e.g., TCP’s
max-min fairness). Clearly, this definition breaks when a single
entity (user) is able to open multiple concurrent flows, as it
is indeed the case in many applications. Briscoe [34] gives a
very thorough discussion of the issues involved. He advocates
a notion of cost fairness between economic entities, thus
avoiding both the per-flow and the instantaneous connotations.
This is consistent with T&C’s assignment of budgets to user
agents as the primary mean for ensuring fairness.
Recently, Briscoe et al [35] proposed an architecture that
operates at the network edges and realizes the cost fairness
model without directly charging users (hence, compatible with
flat pricing). This work introduces re-feedback, a mechanism
that allows measurement of downstream path metrics, such
as delay and congestion. This information can then be used
to police the compliance of end-users with a predetermined
policy (e.g. backoff the sending rate in case of congestion).
The network itself can perform the policing function requiring
only a shaper at the ingress point and a dropper at the egress
point. When doing so, it is the dominant strategy for end-
points to report the correct metrics. This is a congestion control
mechanism that provides the necessary feedback for flows to
adjust their rates, and for the network to police response to
congestion. It is strictly a best-effort scheme, and unlike T&C
it does not provide the means for applications with specific
QoS goals to make trade-offs that satisfy their requirements.
Approaches for congestion-pricing with explicit payments
have been considered in a number of studies. Henderson et al
[36] present a review of the benefits and limitations of these
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Fig. 12. Number of trials until convergence. Left – 5 time-slots, Right – 10 time-slots
proposals. Examples include Smart Markets [32], [37] and
Split-Edge Pricing [38]. Of particular interest is the scheme
proposed by Ganesh et al [22], which assigns costs to packets
depending on congestion. Under a family of non-linear cost
functions that depend on the utilization of the congested link
and the flow’s demand, they showed convergence to steady-
state equilibrium. While our mechanism and system model are
entirely different, our cost function has similar characteristics.
Several works have also studied the [33], [39], [40] pri-
ority queueing systems (a la Diffserv) under game-theoretic
frameworks. So for example, Marback [33] analyzes a priority
queueing scheme where packets get charged based on their
priority, and selfish users compete for bandwidth. Among
other things, he shows that such a scheme leads to a Wardrop
equilibrium and that allocation does not depend on the prices
of each traffic class. A fundamental distinction in this case is
that T&C enables different valuations for different classes of
traffic, and uses these valuations to leverage the trading system.
Park et al [39] consider a QoS class assignment game where
users share a single Generalized Processor Sharing (GPS)
queue and they can assign the class for the traffic. Users do
so, to meet the QoS requirements of their application at the
minimum possible costs (as higher priority also means higher
cost). In this work, they consider both, the case where traffic
may be arbitrarily split between the many service classes and
the unsplittable case where all the traffic is assigned to the
same class. In the splittable case, NE need not exists, but it
is proven that in the unsplittable case NE always exists. In
[40], the authors consider the assignment of service classes
to each user’s traffic at each one of the routers in a path.
In this analysis, each user provides a QoS vector and a utility
function, and the user actions are the choices of service classes
at each router, such that his traffic will meet the QoS goals
with minimum cost. This model is limited to the unsplittable
case, meaning that all the traffic from a user is assigned the
same service class. The incentive for the users is implicit in the
price-by-class scheme, where users requesting higher priority
classes pay more. In addition, payment has to be made to all
intermediary nodes on a route. Chen et al[41] also provide
an efficient distributed implementation and evaluation of their
multi-switch QoS assignment game, where agents running
at the routers and end-points compute the game outcome
on behalf of the users. The performance evaluation shows a
significant improvement on the per-application QoS metrics
with respect to a static reservation mechanism.
A fundamental distinction between T&C and the various
congestion pricing schemes considered in the literature ([35],
[42], [36], [22]) is that none of these schemes takes into
account the dual nature (RT vs. FT) of applications. Therefore,
all these schemes impose penalties (e.g. larger cost, increase
drop rates) to all the traffic from a user during congestion
periods. Because they operate over short-time-scales (target-
ing an instantaneous response to congestion), none of these
approaches exploits the extra degree of freedom offered by
the possibility of time-shifting the execution of RT tasks, or
adjusting the rate of FT tasks.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Trade & Cap is an effective bandwidth management mech-
anism that enables self-interested user agents to collectively
converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation,
based on their individual, private valuation of network utility
(e.g., raw volume vs. QoS over time). T&C not only benefits
users by allowing them to extract better utility from the net-
work, but also benefits the ISP by yielding smoother aggregate
traffic volumes, which lowers traffic transit costs and reduces
the currently unsustainable pressure on ISPs to upgrade their
networks in order to keep up with peak demand. Under T&C,
rather than acting as an arbiter, an ISP acts as an enforcer
of what the community of rational users sharing the resource
decides is a fair allocation of that resource. This is a welcome
departure from current practices that force ISPs to use artificial
notions of fairness to police shared bandwidth use, with
negative implications to privacy and network neutrality.
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